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While it would be difficult to dispute that individuals vary in their facility with both 
their native language and with foreign languages, a central tenet of modern linguistics 
has been that such variation is secondary, and there is a primary level of equality 
across all individuals. Syntactic theory and sociolinguistic theory have both 
contributed to the maintenance of this view, and it provides a socially acceptable 
approach to studying language form and function. However, genes are the authors of 
both similarity and difference, making their role in language complicated to unpick. 
The proposed syntactic basis for equality has been a genetically-determined ‘language 
faculty’, which presumably arose early in the modern species and has reliably 
persisted in all individuals until today. How much fundamental uniformity of 
language knowledge is there, though? Does it matter if a key feature is not observed in 
unwritten languages, if there are languages that permit structures that should be 
prohibited, or if some individuals are less adept at managing purportedly universally 
understood configurations than others? How might culturally augmented features in 
language structure be inappropriately influencing claims about what all languages are 
like? These questions are directly relevant to those engaging with genetics because of 
the growing opportunities to explore the relative roles of environment and genes in 
determining aspects of our language knowledge and performance. More generally for 
society, they present an uncomfortable challenge for how we should handle evidence 
of genetically-based differences in fundamental language ability, should we find it. 
 
1 Introduction: Individual differences in linguistic ability  
 
It is indisputable that there is variation in individuals’ ability to produce and use 
language effectively. We have all met the tongue-tied, people who can’t remember 
jokes, pedants, punsters, those who can remember the numbers but not the letters on a 
car registration plate, loathers of poetry, talented wordsmiths, polyglots, those who 
struggle to grasp words on the tip of their tongue, diplomatic negotiators, and fluent 
gossipers. But where does that variation come from? Since so much of our linguistic 
behaviour is evidently determined by our environment—by our education and 
experience in particular—naturally we will first look there for explanations of 
difference between individuals. However, the role of genes is increasingly under 
examination, particularly now with focus on how genes and environment might 
interact.2 This new research offers linguists interesting challenges that extend beyond 
the domain of language description and modelling, to the heart of how we 
conceptualise our human linguistic heritage, and how we explain and address 
diversity.  
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1.1 The ‘language faculty’ 
One approach to understanding the nature of human language, most strongly 
championed by Noam Chomsky, ascribes to us all a uniform ‘language faculty’ 
(described further in section 3). Universal possession of this faculty means that all 
human languages are constructed according to its specifications, and this makes them 
all equally acquirable by children, who use the faculty to navigate a fast and reliable 
route through their input, to language-specific knowledge. On account of the language 
faculty, it is, in this approach, desirable to capture the essence of a language system as 
a logical description of its properties, and this is achieved using the linguist’s 
intuitions about what constitutes a grammatical sentence. These intuitions are assumed 
to represent those of all native speakers (see later discussion of this point in section 
7.1). In contrast, language as it is used in communication is considered a poor window 
on the underlying system, since various effects of production and performance 
intervene to present a partial and distorted impression of it.3 
 
Compare how people engage with their personal computers. The language faculty is 
rather like the operating system, assumed to be the same for a given set of users, and 
to have a logical shape that can be described. However, people using it, while 
certainly exploiting aspects of its structure and bound overall to operate within what it 
permits, may actually use it in rather odd ways that reflect the experience they have 
had with it, and what they need to achieve. Not only might some aspects of the system 
not be reflected in their usage at all, but a simple underlying structure may appear 
very different, even countermanded, in usage, because intervening, less fundamental 
operations disguise it. Thus, the Chomskian argument is that the linguistic output of 
speakers is too channelled by circumstantial interventions to be an effective way of 
understanding the underlying system. The native speaker’s intuitions, on the other 
hand, offer relatively direct access to it. Judgments about what sounds right, and how 
a given sentence can be grammatically re-expressed, reveal complex patterns of, and 
constraints on, configurations that do not always reflect maximum expediency in the 
communication of ideas.4 
 
Theories of language that are based on emergent properties, on the other hand,5 would 
either deny, or downplay the importance of, an ‘operating system’ that is independent 
of what users do. A more appropriate analogy for them might be how a dance is 
learned. Someone starts doing some steps, and other dancers, through observation, 
begin to pick up the patterns. Over time, the novices become the experts, and others 
pick the dance up from them. There is a ‘system’ in the sense of a patterned dance, but 
it does not exist independently of the dancers, and it may change over time. That it 
always remains a dance—that there are consistent fundamental features such as 
rhythmic, repeated movements carried out standing up—can be attributed to physical 
and other characteristics shared by the dancers that are not themselves about dance 
(eg, being bipedal, having procedural memory), as well as a more general cognitive 
tendency to latch onto certain kinds of features as central, while others are peripheral.6 
 
One can see, even from these two very imperfect analogies, that the role of cultural 
transmission, as opposed to genetic predisposition, is central to debates about 
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language. The different positions can be characterised by imagining a generation that 
did not use the computer, or did not observe the dance: what would be left, what could 
re-emerge, and how similar would it be to what had previously existed?  
 
1.2 Engaging with similarity and variation 
In this paper I want to explore some of the assumptions and claims about the role of 
genes in defining the nature of human language. Much has been published on this 
topic already, and rather than rehearse existing arguments in depth, I shall often 
simply note their existence and move on. This is because I want to focus on some 
issues that have been less often brought out, including our social unease when it 
comes to challenging the entailment of the language faculty account, that all humans 
have an equal capacity for language at the fundamental level.7 
 
In section 2, I contextualise the discussion by exploring perceptions of genes as agents 
of similarity and difference. Sections 3 and 4 deal with claims regarding the 
uniformity of our fundamental capacity for language, and why it is attractive to 
maintain this belief, even in the face of potential counter-evidence. In section 5, 
explanations for the origins of uniformity are considered, and in section 6, I itemise 
some evidence of variation at the fundamental level. This leads to a testing, in section 
7, of the assumptions underpinning the interpretation of apparent evidence for 
genetically-determined uniformity in language, and the offering of an alternative 
explanation. Finally, in section 8, I note the current interest in genetic variation in 
language performance, and consider the extent to which the role of environment in 
creating the appearance of genetic uniformity may have been under-estimated. 
 
2 Genes as agents of similarity and difference 
 
Genes make us the same as each other, and different from each other. At the species 
level, our genes make us human and other species non-human. At this level, genes 
explain why a child acquires language while the family dog does not, even though 
they may be spoken to equally and in not dissimilar ways. The essential humanness of 
language is not unduly diminished by evidence that apes can make quite a good job of 
language comprehension8 and that parrots display, in comprehension and speech, an 
impressive command of semantics;9 for there is no real evidence as yet that non-
human species have grasped the key features of human language structure (see section 
3).10 
 
At the same time, we see our genes as part of the reason why we are different from 
even our siblings (unless we have an identical twin, in which case differences must be 
explained another way). Individual characteristics can be the result of a random 
mutation or copying error in our DNA, but most of them are inherited and have only 
the appearance of uniqueness, because no one else in the family happens to have 
expressed the trait. Between the two extremes of shared human-ness and individuality, 
we also recognise how certain genes, particularly but not only those responsible for 
visible traits, make us like our family, but different from those outside the family. 
Extending upwards, we acknowledge that our genes give us visible physical 
characteristics that make us look more similar to people in some populations in the 
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world than others. Thus, our perception of the role of the gene contributes to how we 
construct our personal and social identity as a combination of differences from, and 
similarities with, others. 
 
Where in this picture, then, do we locate differences in people’s language ability? Are 
they reflections of those genes that make us individual—perhaps genes directly 
determining some aspect of our capacity for language—or are they a superficial, 
environmentally-determined layer atop fundamental uniformity for language ability? 
Or both? Generally, there has been a tendency to acknowledge that differences in 
aspects of our language ability can have a genetic basis, but to view the genetic 
component as non-linguistic, with linguistic consequences. For instance, poor memory 
or low concentration could affect the ability fully to benefit from opportunities for 
learning the finer skills of language presented experientially. Such explanations seem 
more comfortable for us than proposing that particular genes directly determine why 
our vocabulary size is different from someone else’s, or why we are particularly good, 
or bad, at learning other languages. Research evidence so far appears to concur. 
Although a single-point mutation of the FOXP2 gene has been associated with 
language deficits, the gene’s role seems to be in regulating brain development, with 
knock-on effects for language, rather than directly supporting articulation or 
grammar.11 
 
It may be feasible to explain everything about language in terms of the interaction of 
environmental influences and genetically-endowed abilities that are not of themselves 
specifically linguistic. What is uniform about how we engage with linguistic structure 
would, then, be a natural consequence of how these factors interact. However, 
proponents of the language faculty believe otherwise—the faculty is construed as a 
uniform, language-specific genetic inheritance. 
 
3 Structural arguments for language uniformity 
 
Over some 50 years, Noam Chomsky has maintained that humans possess a “language 
organ” whose “basic character is an expression of the genes.”12 According to 
Chomsky, our basic genetic endowment determines an “initial state of the language 
faculty”, “a ‘language acquisition device’ that takes experience as ‘input’ and gives 
the language as an ‘output’ … that is internally represented in the mind/brain.”13 The 
language faculty is logically necessary, Chomsky claims, to explain how children 
acquire their first language with such extraordinary speed and consistency, 
irrespective of the quantity and quality of the input and, in particular, how they are 
able to infer certain grammatical patterns on the basis of only negative evidence. The 
faculty ensures that children know what to look for in the input, in order to make 
structural sense of it.14 In recent accounts just two properties lie at the heart of this 
universal knowledge of language grammar: structure dependence and recursivity. 
After briefly reviewing the nature of each, we shall also consider one of the properties 
claimed to be consequential on them, Subjacency. 
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3.1 Structure dependence 
In structure dependence, small units of language combine into larger units, and units 
maintain their underlying integrity if the sentence is reformulated. To briefly 
exemplify, turning the statement in (1) into the question in (2) entails the recognition 
that the ‘was’ that moves to the start of the question is the second one in (1), not the 
first one. The clause ‘that was seen in the River Thames’ is a unit embedded in 
another unit, ‘The whale was a juvenile’. The question formation involves this outer 
clause, not the embedded one, so that it is the verb in the outer clause that is fronted, 
not its identical counterpart in the embedded clause. 
 
1) The whale that was seen in the River Thames was a juvenile. 
2) Was the whale that was seen in the River Thames a juvenile? 
 
Chomsky argues that if children did not come to language acquisition already 
knowing the principle of structure dependence, they could all too easily infer, from 
simpler examples such as (3) that the rule was ‘move the first verb to the front’, an 
adequate way to generate (4), but also leading to the creation of the ungrammatical 
(5).15 (The asterisk on (5) indicates that the sentence is classified as ungrammatical). 
 
3) The whale was a juvenile. 
4) Was the whale a juvenile? 
5) *Was the whale that seen in the River Thames was a juvenile? 
 
The ubiquity of structure dependence in language, and its possible non-linguistic 
precursors in our species, as indicated by counterparts in animal cognition,16 mean it 
is hardly contentious to suppose that humans possess some sort of innate dispositio
towards it. However, many, including Newmeyer, still see it as specific, in its 
instantiation, to the language faculty: “The structure dependence of grammatical rules 
might well have its evolutionary antecedence in some general human (or, more likely, 
biological) preference for structural solutions to complex problems. But structure 





Recursivity is the single feature identified by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch as making 
human language unique.18 Recursivity in language means that the output of one 
grammatical operation can act as the input for another. The effect is that there is no 
logical bar on the complexity of sentences. It is, for instance, grammatical to embed 
one clause inside another, then another inside that, another inside that, and so on (6-
10).19 
 
6) The mechanic tells fortunes.  
7) I know the mechanic tells fortunes. 
8) I know the mechanic the tailor saw yesterday tells fortunes.  
9) I know the mechanic the tailor who makes those suits saw yesterday tells fortunes. 
10) I know the mechanic the tailor who makes those suits you were thinking of buying 
saw yesterday tells fortunes. 
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3.3 Subjacency: a consequential property 
In Chomsky’s models until the mid-1990s, certain additional properties of language 
were considered universals in their own right. One of them was Subjacency. 
Subjacency constrains grammatical relations arising from embedding. When one 
clause is embedded inside another, grammatical dependencies can arise across them. 
An item in one clause may cross-refer to an item in another; an item in one clause may 
be deleted because it also exists in another, setting up a dependency between the 
explicit item and the gap where the deleted item was; or an item may be ‘moved’ into 
another clause in order to fulfil a particular function, as in English when wh-questions 
are created. Subjacency prevents the linked items—in the case of a wh-question, the 
moved wh-word and its original location (or trace)—becoming impossible to track, by 
constraining the amount and type of structural material that may intervene. The effect 
is to allow (12) but not (13) as grammatical developments of (11), even though (13) is 
simply a wh-fronted version of (14).  
 
11) Elsie bought a coat. 
12) What do you believe (that) Elsie bought? 
13) *What do you believe the claim that Elsie bought? 
14) You believe the claim that Elsie bought what? 
 
Chomsky’s Minimalist Program simplified the notion of Universal Grammar, by 
making principles like Subjacency a logical consequence of the two core features—
structure dependence and recursivity—plus language-specific rules.20 Thus, “the 
learning child … minimally needs a notion of hierarchical structure plus an 
understanding of transformations and constraints on them.”21 Adherence to 
Subjacency is ensured if the child knows that the progressive stages by which a 
‘transformed’ sentence such as a wh-question is constructed must occur sequentially, 
in “‘successive cyclic’ movements, each of which cross a minimal unit of structure.”22 
Violations of Subjacency occur when one or more of the individual cycles cannot be 
completed, on account of an item occupying a slot that must be empty when that cycle 
takes place. In section 6 we shall consider the claim that Subjacency cannot be 
construed as ‘universal’ since it does not manifest in all languages. 
 
4 Social arguments for uniformity 
 
Although syntactic models of language knowledge and sociolinguistic descriptions of 
language behaviour have generally had little to say to each other, they have common 
socio-political foundations. Sociolinguistic theory has maintained over many years 
that varieties spoken by uneducated groups, typically viewed by the establishment as 
aberrant consequences of ignorance, are in fact no less complex or expressively rich 
than the standard variety.23 These observations are consistent with the egalitarian 
Chomskian position: we all start with the same genetically endowed language faculty 
and use it to treat our input. Since our language faculty obliges us to shape our input 
data in particular ways, it follows that all output will be of the same fundamental 
complexity. Therefore, while socially imbued contrasts between languages and 
varieties cannot be denied, they are only that. Change the social conditions, and the 
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variety viewed as most ‘ignorant’ could become the one considered most correct and 
desirable. 
 
It is clearly socially problematic to suggest that one speaker group is in any way 
fundamentally disadvantaged for language relative to another.24 Socially induced 
differences (education provision, access to books, cultural priorities) can be put right 
through social policies. It would be different indeed to suggest, for instance, that 
members of a particular group had encoded in their genes a different type of language 
faculty, that predisposed them to lesser, or greater, capability for language. As with 
intelligence,25 language ability is an invisible and contingent trait: it is not known 
unless it is measured, and it is defined according to particular social values. Such traits 
are particularly socially sensitive because of the ease with which their presence can be 
inappropriately inferred by association with a proxy, visible trait such as skin colour, 
age, gender or disability. The association of invisible traits with visible ones is 
invidious because unless both are equally ubiquitous (and anything socially 
interpreted will tend not to be) the one is not a reliable index of the other. To put it 
crudely, it is socially unacceptable—and for good reason—to look at someone’s 
appearance and infer thereby that they will be less intelligent or a less able language 
user than someone else. 
 
The uniformitarian perspective on language arose in response to racialist attitudes, 
whereby it was presumed that the ‘noble savage’ possessed a lesser (or occasionally 
greater) capacity for language than the European, and that different races could be 
located at different points on a directional evolutionary continuum.26 It is anathema to 
modern western society that anything construed as desirable should be entirely 
unattainable, and thus much more comfortable to downplay any notion of fixed 
ceilings of achievement, whether associated with random individuals, family groups, 
classes or, most undesirably of all, ‘races’.27 
 
Yet genetics research is increasingly likely to demand answers to difficult questions. 
In the account above I have focussed on the least desirable scenario, whereby some 
genetically-determined variation creates ‘inequality’. That is, where some populations 
are viewed as better at language, in some sense, than others, in a way that parallels the 
claims for systematic differences in IQ levels. However, not all differences entail 
inequality, and one line of recent research indicates the scope for challenging the 
notion of uniformity without an associated social stigma. Research by Dediu and 
Ladd28 suggests that a particular pattern of genetic variation (derived haplogroups of 
two genes) explains the distribution of tone languages around the world. Tone 
languages use patterns of pitch change to differentiate meanings. Dediu and Ladd 
propose that “[t]hose areas of the world where the new alleles are relatively rare also 
tend to be the areas where tone languages are common,” 29 and that the relationship is 
causal—“the genetic structure of a population can exert an influence on the 
language(s) spoken by that population.”30 They hypothesise that the genetic effects on 
brain structure determine how tone is handled during the process of language 
acquisition, with an impact, in heavily affected populations, on the culturally 
transmitted linguistic code. That is, languages spoken by populations in which many 
individuals have some difficulty in processing tone will tend to lose their tonal 
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features. They are careful to note that “there is no evidence that tone itself confers any 
advantage or disadvantage on speakers,”31 so this particular effect should be socially 
neutral. However, we must not forget that society often interprets variation 
judgmentally, and where systematic difference is once found, prejudice may follow.  
 
5 Explanations of uniformity 
 
Chomsky’s claim that all humans possess the same fundamental language knowledge 
draws us inexorably to the question of when and how that knowledge arose, and how 
it is that humans today still all have it. The most plausible answer to the first part of 
the question is that it arose in the small sub-population of humans whose descendents 
we all are, and that possessing it gave the ancestral sub-population a distinct survival 
advantage over contemporaries without it. In order to avoid the complications of 
polygenesis,32 we assume the language faculty arose once only, some time before 
modern man dispersed out of Africa around 100,000 years ago.33 As to explaining its 
uniformly reliable persistence, there are at least three options. One is that selection 
pressures ensure the failure of anyone without the language faculty to survive and 
reproduce. Another is that the language faculty, while less than crucial for survival on 
its own, is tied into other basic human functions without which an individual could not 
survive and reproduce. A third is that the genetic basis of the language faculty is 
highly conserved, that is, remarkably resilient to mutation.34 
 
It is for others to weigh the plausibility of these and other options. It need only be 
noted here that such evolutionary accounts are predicated on the assumption of 
uniformity today, so evidence challenging the extent of that uniformity (see section 6) 
potentially impacts on our understanding of what evolved and how.35 
 
6 Evidence for variation 
 
What sort of variation in language knowledge or performance would directly 
challenge the claim that we have a genetically-endowed language faculty? Although, 
as we shall see in section 8, there is place for examining the relative roles of genes and 
environment in the variation found across a wide range of aspects of language 
knowledge and performance, that agenda arises separately, and somewhat 
independently, of the claim for a language faculty. For the present, therefore, the 
question is whether variation can be adduced in relation to the language knowledge 
that the innateness accounts have construed as immutable. As we saw in section 3, this 
knowledge relates to two core features of language, structure dependence and 
recursivity, and a range of consequential features, including Subjacency, previously 
identified as central to Universal Grammar. 
 
Before Subjacency and other similar principles were ‘down-graded’ it was reasonable 
to argue that if one could find a language without Subjacency, one had found evidence 
that the theory of Universal Grammar was invalid. However, Newmeyer36 promotes 
the weaker version of UG theory that the Minimalist Program makes possible. It is 
unproblematic to find languages without Subjacency, so long as this is only because 
there is no scope for it to apply (eg, because the language does not use sufficiently 
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complex embedding). However, it is vital for the theory that when the language 
develops the additional clausal complexity that provides the forum for Subjacency to 
apply, then it will apply.  
 
The weak Universal Grammar hypothesis challenges its opponents to offer a more 
compelling kind of evidence than simply the absence of Subjacency in languages 
without multiple embedding, eg: 
 
i) Evidence of the grammatical acceptability of Subjacency violations in languages 
that do have adequate levels of embedding; 
ii) Evidence of languages failing to apply recursion, even when expressing appropriate 
semantic dependencies; 
iii) Evidence that individuals given examples of complex sentences cannot reliably 
understand them; 
iv) Evidence of languages failing reliably to demonstrate structure dependence. 
 
There is not, to my knowledge, any instantiation of (iv), though it must be borne in 
mind that the assumption of structure dependence is so basic a notion to us, that it 
would be difficult to describe a new language without doggedly pursuing the 
expectation of it, even if it was not there.37 Meanwhile, Wray38 provides 
(incidentally) a means of explaining away any examples that appear at odds w
structure dependence, by proposing that communication is not always reliant on rul
bound forms. Formulaic expressions can become and remain irregular by being 
processed as single lex
ith 
e-
ical entries.  
 
The other three proposed types of evidence are apparently attested. Regarding (i), 
Culicover notes that “there are languages such as Italian, Swedish and Icelandic in 
which systematic violations of Subjacency are possible, in the sense that sentences 
which would be judged ungrammatical in English are judged grammatical in these 
languages. There is evidence that it does not even hold uniformly for English.”39 
 
In relation to (ii), Everett40 has claimed that Pirahã, a language spoken in the Brazilian 
Amazon, does not display recursion—it has no embedding. Less extreme claims have 
been made regarding other languages. Mithun suggests that “[l]anguages and speakers 
vary considerably in the exploitation of this syntactic device” 41 and, like Ong,42 she 
sees subordination as a feature of writing rather than speech.43 Kalmár44 reports a 
marked increase in grammatical subordination in Inuktitut after decontextualised 
writing, and translation from English, became more common. In the weaker version of 
the Universal Grammar hypothesis, the absence of embedding is inconsequential if, on 
account of having no written tradition, for instance, the relevant semantic 
dependencies are not expressed at all. But Everett proposes that Pirahã does express 
the meanings that other languages achieve through embedding, and this constitutes 
one part of his claim that Pirahã stands outside the scope of predicted ‘possible’ 
languages. 
 
Evidence of variation in people’s capacity to understand complex embedded sentences 
(iii) has been offered by Chipere.45 His experimental stimuli were sentences like (15), 
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for which he solicited both direct repetitions and answers to comprehension questions 
(eg, What does the doctor know? and What surprises Tom?). 
 
15) The doctor knows that the fact that taking good care of himself is essential 
surprises Tom. 
 
He found non-graduate native speakers less able than native and non-native speaker 
graduates to take into account the various parts of the structure when responding to 
comprehension questions. Since the non-native speaker graduates actually gave the 
most accurate responses to some questions, Chipere suggests that explicit instruction 
in the grammar of English (of which the non-native graduates would have experienced 
most and the non-graduate native speakers least) is of assistance in understanding 
complex sentences. 
 
He also found that individuals unable to remember or understand the stimuli 
responded well to training, explaining his results by means of Ericsson & Kintsch’s 
proposal that “in skilled activities, acquired memory skills allow [the] products [of 
interim operations] to be stored in long-term memory and kept directly accessible by 
means of retrieval cues in short-term memory.”46 Chipere suggests that training in 
how to understand complex sentences supports the development of a rule-based 
strategy for unpacking them, without which it is more natural to interpret them by 
analogy, using “syntactic formulae, … impose[d] top-down on the input”.47 Possible 
implications of Chipere’s proposal are considered in section 8. 
 
7 Causes and effects of variation 
 
7.1 Cultural enhancements of language 
If one believes that all languages are essentially equal in complexity, all the natural 
product of a species-wide language capacity, it is not unreasonable to examine only a 
small number of languages in order to identify the features of that capacity. However, 
for as long as these beliefs are only beliefs, it is obviously necessary to ensure that 
there is no bias in the sample, lest one attribute universality to some feature that is a 
secondary accretion peculiar to the sampled languages. Grace48 outlines dangers 
inherent in a culture-centric approach to language description. English, the language 
most often drawn upon for modern linguistic analysis, is in many respects an artificial 
language. It has a long history of literary development and of standardisation. While it 
remains ‘natural’ in the sense that native speakers acquire it, the version they acquire 
is frequently treated as culturally inadequate, so that additional training, through 
education, is required to master the niceties of specific varieties elevated as ‘correct’. 
Since the features of this ‘correctness’ have accreted over time—mostly as 
expressions of preferences imposed by intellectual adults49 and often emulating 
patterns in Latin and Greek—there is no reason why the standard forms of English, 
locked into writing, though then extrapolated back as an educated spoken code, should 
reflect all and only natural patterns. The kinds of sentences at the heart of Chomskian 
accounts of complex grammar might therefore be ‘unnatural’. 
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In an application of Grace’s ideas to the question of language evolution, Wray & 
Grace50 offer a model of how cultural demands, particularly the need to talk to 
‘outsiders’, augment a less ambitious default version of language structure in the 
direction of greater explicitness and regularity. One outcome might be a greater use of 
embedding for encoding complex meaning relationships in a retrievable way. Wray & 
Grace propose that for most of human evolution, languages have not been under the 
cultural pressure that augments their form in these directions.  
 
7.2 Genetic variation over time 
The evolutionary origin of language also offers another potential explanation for 
variation between languages at the fundamental level. Let us suppose that a dedicated 
language faculty did arise in our species some time around or after 200,000 years ago. 
Our earliest modern ancestors, let us imagine, understood the principles of structure 
dependence and recursion. Let us further suppose that they understood structural 
relations in multiply embedded sentences after the movement of constituents—even 
though their spoken language(s) never provided a context in which to exercise that 
knowledge. 
 
Although this provides a uniform starting point for our species, under what 
circumstances would that uniformity remain? Two hundred thousand years is a very 
long time for a trait to be maintained with 100% reliability across the human 
population, when it is not in use, and when no disadvantage ensues from its absence.51 
Why, over the many millennia during which—if Wray & Grace are right—embedding 
was barely in use, might not some humans emerge, who by virtue of slightly different 
innate language knowledge, or on account of some difference in how they approach 
information processing and storage, find embedded structures more difficult to 
compute? At the time, no one would notice, whether it were a trait in random 
individuals across all populations, or one passed down in family lines. In theory, it 
could even come to characterise one gender more than the other, or a particular 
coherent population—we are back on socially sensitive ground.  
 
My aim is not particularly to suggest that the universality of an original language 
faculty actually has been undermined by silent genetic variation, so much as to 
indicate that we need to explain why it could not have been. In actual fact, were we to 
become satisfied that a feature of language such as recursion was not equally 
represented in the innate knowledge of all individuals, we should probably not wish to 
hypothesise the undoing of something originally ubiquitous at all, unless there was no 
other way to explain the origins of its vestiges in the species. Even so, the idea that we 
have innate linguistic knowledge the detail of which has diverged in the course of 
evolution is too important to set aside, and it raises interesting issues for 
consideration, as explored in the final section. 
 
8.0 Less than black and white 
 
A few years ago people talked simplistically of a ‘language gene’, and that made it 
easy to conceptualise all humans as equally linguistically endowed. But the accepted 
view now is that our capacity for language is determined by many genes, many or all 
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of which might exist in variant forms. Whether defining language as a ‘complex trait’ 
obviates the possibility that there lies at their heart some special, invariant faculty 
dedicated to language is a topic of continuing debate. 
 
As for perceptions of the role of the environment, they too have become more 
complex. Although it remains likely that much of the variation in language and 
languages is culturally-determined and maintained, it is now increasingly recognised 
that genes and environment interact. For example, in epigenetics the expression of the 
gene is determined by an environmental trigger.52 Nettle53 tentatively suggests 
another kind of gene-environment interaction in relation to Dediu and Ladd’s findings 
for tone languages, described earlier. Where they propose that a particular genetic 
expression may have influenced the properties of a pattern in the languages spok
the affected people, Nettle additionally proposes that, in return, the language featur






The more complex the genetic and environmental factors determining language are 
seen to be, the harder it is to be sure on what basis we can safely judge a feature of 
language to be truly invariant across all normal humans. Most research discusses 
whether or not the phenomenon of language can be explained without recourse to a 
universal language faculty, but in this paper I have focussed on two different 
questions—whether the faculty, if it did exist, could have variant forms, and whether, 
if it did, we would be able to tell. 
 
Specifically, I have explored the possibility that our cultural engagement with 
language influences our linguistic knowledge at the most fundamental level, and I 
have considered whether our evolutionary development could have supported a 
bifurcation (or more) in people’s innate knowledge about language, as the result of 
genetic variation. Were both true, it could mean that what one person did through 
innate knowledge, another could learn to do. Chipere’s55 work offers one candidate 
type of knowledge—the processing of complex embedded structures using long term 
memory.56 Inherited predispositions to handle complex embedded structures without, 
versus only with, training would constitute a very subtle distinction of no 
consequence, until cultural practices arose that prized the ability to encode and decode 
complex language, while the associated educational system was less than vigilant 
about teaching that ability to those not immediately adept. Such circumstances could 
play a role in creating and sustaining differences in social and material attainment. 
Since the skill was learnable, bootstrapping would be entirely feasible, but effort 
would be entailed if one were to match the natural abilities of those with the innate 
disposition.  
 
Irrespective of the plausibility of this particular scenario, variation between 
individuals in relation to what we term ‘language aptitude’ or ‘flair for language’ does 
exist and may not be easily explained in terms of environment alone. For this reason 
there is an urgent need for research into the genetic basis for the many aspects of 
variation in language knowledge and aptitude—as now being undertaken for Specific 
Language Impairment,57 and through twin studies.58,59 Twin studies can help separate 
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out the genetic contribution to variation from that partly or entirely due to 
environment. Evidence suggests, however, that not only postnatal but also perinatal 
environmental factors play a role in how language develops,60 a fact that complicates 
assumptions about genetically identical input being expressed identically in different 
individuals even in the early years of life.  
 
Establishing the role of genes in determining our language abilities is only one part of 
the challenge, however. The other is learning to cope with all of the possible outcomes 
of such research. A mature society needs a means of dealing with the discovery of 
genetically-based differences in capabilities that, on strongly defensible cultural 
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